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• Beyond freedom of speech: civil clashes, individual rights and collective
consciousness
The freedom to disseminate true information, and the freedom to express ideas and
opinions make it possible to develop knowledge and provide a basis for political debate.
These freedoms are also the basis of political debate, but they are, in themselves, not
enough to turn an enemy into a rival, and even less so to make that enemy a friend. In fact,
the truth is usually one of the first victims in any armed conflict: all wars are based on
deception, wrote Sun Tzu; and when war is being waged, the expression of ideas
degenerates into propaganda.
Almost a generation has passed since we began publishing accounts and commentaries on
developments in Spanish applied case law with a bearing on defamation and freedom of
expression (Pablo SALVADOR CODERCH et al., 1987 and 1990; Pablo SALVADOR CODERCH et
al., 1996; Pablo SALVADOR CODERCH, M.ª Teresa CASTIÑEIRA PALOU, 1997; Pablo SALVADOR
CODERCH et al., 1999). Our objective on this occasion is the same as it has been in the past:
to attempt to redirect civil conflict toward political confrontation under the guidance of two clear
constitutional principles – a sincere pursuit of truth and an open debate of ideas. As readers of
InDret will soon see, this is not an easy task.
• Supreme Court, 1st Chamber, 8.3.1999. Children of Carlos Trías Bertrán v.
“Corporació Catalana de Ràdio i Televisió” and others
1. The case
The Civil War (1936-1939) was the most serious conflict of contemporary Spain. The review
of an episode dating back to that period of struggle led to a significant ruling on
defamation when the allegedly defamatory information that was the object of the suit
referred to a deceased person.
On 27.11.1994 “TV3”, the main Catalan public television channel, broadcasted a
documentary entitled “Sumaríssim 477”, which concerned the Court Martial, held in Burgos
in August of 1937, of Manuel Carrasco i Formiguera (1890-1938), a Catalan politician who
was the founder and president of Unió Democràtica de Catalunya, a Christian Democratic
political party. The extremely brief trial concluded with a ruling that convicted Mr.
Carrasco and sentenced him to death, and this sentence was carried out on 9.4.1938.
At one point in the documentary, the narrator stated that:
“The court convicted Carrasco exclusively on the basis of the testimony of eight
Catalans residing in Burgos. These witnesses appeared voluntarily before the
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examining magistrate. There is no doubt as to their identities: they were José Ribas
Seba, head of the Falangist Movement in Catalonia, José Maria Fontana, member of
the Falange, Antonio Martínez Tomás, journalist, José Bru Jardí, journalist, Diego
Ramírez Pastor, journalist, Carlos Trias Bertran, lawyer, Josep Lluch Bonastre,
lawyer, and Enrique Najés de Duran, lawyer. They had no compassion: Carrasco
was  ’a red and a separatist’. The defense called these “bogus witnesses -- rumor
mongers with a chip on their shoulders”.
At the end of the documentary, a text appeared on screen stating:
“All the witnesses for the prosecution held high posts in the Administration and the
pro-Franco press from 1940 on”.
The plaintiffs were all children of Mr. Carlos Trías Bertrán († 1969), one of those named as
witnesses in the documentary. They filed a suit against the author of such documentary,
against “Televisió de Catalunya, SA” and against the “Corporació Catalana de Ràdio i Televisió”,
seeking a declaration of the existence of illegitimate interference constituting defamation
against Mr. Carlos Trías Bertrán. They also sought compensation, to be determined later,
the publication of the ruling, and the removal of specific sentences and images from the
documentary.
The Ley Orgánica 1/1982, de 5 de mayo, de protección civil del derecho al honor, a la intimidad
personal y familiar y a la propia imagen (LO 1/1982 – basic laws and statutes for civil protection
against defamation and invasion of privacy) supports protection against defamation and invasion
of privacy as values of personality. Such rights are protected post mortem, and, along the same
lines, art. 4 LO 1/1982 regulates the active capacity to bring an action for civil protection of the
values of personality of the deceased. An order of preference is established. This provides for
primary consideration of the will of the right holder: only in cases where there is no record of this
is capacity granted to family members – spouse, descendents, ascendants and siblings – and,
residually, to the Attorney General’s office (María E. ROVIRA SUERIO, 1999, p. 280 and following).
The Trial Court number 13 of Barcelona (20.12.1996) allowed the suit in full and declared
the existence of illegitimate interference by the defendants constituting defamation against
Mr. Trías Bertrán. The defendants were ordered to publish the ruling at their cost, to
remove from all copies of the documentary the text quoted above and the on-screen text at
the end of the documentary, and to pay compensation (purely symbolic) in the amount of 5
pesetas (approximately 3 euro cents), in addition to legal fees.
The defendants appealed, but the Court of Appeals of Barcelona upheld the ruling of the
Court. In their subsequent appeal to the Supreme Court, the defendants alleged the
violation of arts. 7.7 LO 1/1982, art. 20.1 CE, and the applied case law based on these
articles (rulings of the Constitutional Court, 4th Chamber, 21.1.1988; 1st Chamber, 12.11.1990
and of the Supreme Court, 1st Chamber, 13.10.1998 and 5.2.1998). The Supreme Court
reversed the initial ruling and dismissed the plaintiffs’ allegations: it was the view of the
Court that the historical events related were well-founded, and that these events along with
the opinions and value judgments expressed were of relevance to the public:
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“(T)he historical circumstances of the pre-war period and the civil war dealt with in
the documentary are of public relevance and general interest (…). The truth of the
narrated events is also beyond debate. The essential fact is that Carlos Trías Bertrán
was a witness for the prosecution (along with other Catalans) in a summary court
martial in which the accused was the Catalan politician Manuel Carrasco i
Formiguera. Furthermore, as the initial ruling points out, it is unlikely that as a
lawyer he would not be aware of the probable consequences of an accusation of
that nature, at that place and time (…).
The truthfulness of two adjectives (sic) used – 'exclusively' and 'voluntarily' – must
be examined. In the documentary it states that 'the Court convicted Carrasco
exclusively on the basis of the testimony of eight Catalans…' and the fact is that the
ruling says no such thing; but neither does it say the opposite: the Court that
condemned the accused to death does not indicate specific facts that justify a death
sentence, but rather political positions; it did not pass judgment on facts, but rather
on political behavior and political opinion. These were the charges that led to the
execution of Carrasco. As the initial ruling points out, it was a symbol that was
being executed: 'Carrasco is everything: he is Catalonia and he is the Republic;
therefore, it cannot be said that he was convicted exclusively on the basis of the
declarations made by witnesses, but neither can it be said that it was on the basis of
other evidence (evidence of what?). In conclusion, the adjective 'exclusively' is a
value judgment, an opinion, (protected under freedom of expression), not a fact
(protected under freedom of information, if true). This is also the case with the
statement 'they appeared voluntarily before the examining magistrate': they
appeared following a legal summons; there is no indication that they appeared
'voluntarily', but neither is there any indication that they appeared against their
will. A legal summons does not exclude either of these possibilities. Moreover, as in
the case of 'exclusively', the use of 'voluntarily' constitutes a value judgment, an
opinion, not a fact.
In the documentary, it states that 'they had no compassion'. This is a value judgment, an
opinion formed of one who was a witness for the prosecution in a summary trial at that
particular historical moment. It also states that the witnesses for the prosecution,
including the father of the claimants, 'held high posts in the Administration and the
pro-Franco press from 1940 on', which is objectively true; if the claimants maintain that
this statement is made in relation with their testimony as prosecution witnesses, then it
is indeed a value judgment. The statement made in the documentary is true, and there
is no room for qualifications or discussion” (4th Section of Legal Reasoning).
For the Supreme Court, the discussion of the truthfulness of the facts related focused on
two adverbs: the first – ”exclusively” – in the statement “the Court convicted Carrasco
exclusively on the basis of the testimony of eight Catalans…”; and the second --
”voluntarily” – in the statement “they appeared voluntarily before the examining
magistrate”. Adverbs may be classified as nuclear or peripheral based on whether or not
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their omissions affects the sense of the rest of the sentence (Ignacio BOSQUE and Violeta
DEMONTE, 1999, p. 725): “he wounded him fatally” (nuclear); “he greeted them politely”
(peripheral). The authors of this paper are not professional grammarians, members of any
jury, nor judges in the case, but it is the view of the majority of them that in “Sumaríssim”,
the adverbs were peripheral. This is, in the final analysis, an arguable conclusion: we leave
it to the reader to judge.
2. The difficulty of putting history on trial
In any case, the 4th Section of Legal Reasoning in the ruling being reviewed did not follow
this course, but rather it reduced the empirical question concerning the historical events
related in the controversial documentary to ‘value judgments’ – mere opinions. In this
manner, the object of the suit became a debate about the symbols that make up our
historical memory. For the Court, the term “exclusively” is a value judgment, an opinion,
protected by freedom of expression: the Court went so far as to say (rather implausibly)
that “it was a symbol that was executed by the firing squad”. The same procedure is used
to take the use of the word “voluntarily” from the realm of facts and place it in that of
value judgments and opinions: in the absence of evidence of the voluntary or forced
character of the conduct in question, maintaining either position is “a value judgment, an
opinion, not a fact”, according to the Court. However, in this case, the authors of this Note
take a different view: the fact that certain aspects of events are not known does not mean
that statements about them are simply opinions. The fact that it is impossible to disprove a
conjecture does not legitimate its affirmation for the same reason that it does not justify its
negation. There are some puzzling cases.
Nevertheless, it must be admitted that the flight from the concrete reality of the case being
judged and the reformulation of the debate in symbolic terms had already been initiated by
the claimants themselves. In their suit, and to some extent in the case resolved by Decision
of the Supreme Court, 1st Chamber, 2.6.2000, they sought essentially to vindicate the
memory of their father and to suppress or partially suppress the subsequent broadcast of
“Sumaríssim 477”. Fundamentally, their objective was to avoid the formation of a collective
memory that they viewed as incorrect. They sought to reclaim the memory of their
deceased father; their primary interest was not to obtain economic reparation. It is true, as
we have already indicated, that in the suit they sought compensation, but when the initial
ruling awarded damages that were solely symbolic, the plaintiffs took no interest in the
question of compensation. Consequently, neither did they take any interest in those aspects
of the case that might make it possible to establish damages – what art. 139.2 de la Ley
30/1992 (article 139.2 of Law 30/1992) describes as harm that is “actual, possible to value
economically and individualized”. Thus, the suit took on a symbolic dimension, at the
expense of any individual and private protection sought. In the final formulation of the
case, if there is indeed harm, it is to the collective historical consciousness: the matter
became an exclusively social phenomenon. First on appeal and then before the Supreme
Court, the theme of the debate moved away from the correct application of the legal
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provisions governing compensation for harm caused by defamation, to focus instead on the
meaning of history that the documentary sought to narrate. However, once placed on this
level, the debate could only focus on the events that sustained the opinion that was to be
transmitted about those events: only if the events narrated clearly did not take place would
the claim be well founded. However, if the events were essentially true, any opinion about
them is free and is protected by freedom of expression, unless perhaps that opinion is
unnecessarily slanderous or libelous.
It is reasonable to pass judgment on conducts, but to judge identities is a perversion of
justice. It amounts to reducing the various branches of the legal system (criminal, civil,
constitutional) to a question of the rights of authorship: judging identities presupposes that
it is possible to seek the conviction of a person or group of people not for their behavior,
but rather for what they are, or were at some point in their lives. During the Civil War and
in the post war period, many died violent deaths for what they were or what they had
been, rather than for what they had done, or even for what they had not done. The ruling
being reviewed is a paradigmatic example of this. It is not easily subjected to legal
discussion, and concerns collective identities, or, in other words, the historical memory of a
community, rather than individual behavior. “Sumaríssim” is not a civil law suit for
damages that concerns the possible behavior that hypothetically led to those damages; it is
not even a suit that concerns absolute rights (as defamation does), being free of specific
forms of intrusion: it is rather fundamentally a conflict that concerns the shared ideas that
are the basis of the social identity of a community. From this point of view, the problem
transcends individual questions of the right to protection from defamation, that is,
questions concerning the reputation and self-esteem of a person, or, if that person is
deceased, of his/her descendants: the focus of the conflict is the common, shared
knowledge of a group of people that allows each of them to identify himself or herself as a
member of a community. The claimants took a different view of the accuracy of this shared
knowledge and sought, literally, to suppress it as an element of the collective consciousness
of the community. Their interest was not economic: they did not claim to have suffered any
damages. They sought to avoid what they understandably saw as a distortion of historical
events – a false image of reality.
“Sumaríssim” is, therefore, a suit about ideas, situated, even for the plaintiffs themselves,
outside of the ambit of civil actions concerning compensation. However, civil law and
constitutional civil law contemplate absolute rights, such as the fundamental right to
protection from defamation. The violation of this right would be a sound basis for negatory
actions, such as that taken by the claimants in this case. In any case, the empirical basis of
plaintiff's case was probably weak: the core of the expressions that were the object of the
suit consisted of opinions – value judgments protected by freedom of expression (broader
in its application than freedom of information). Furthermore, the aspects of these
expressions that could be empirically disproved were put in a manner that was general
enough to make them substantially true: the father of the claimants had been called as a
prosecution witness; he had indeed testified in the legal process in question; and he had
held public positions during the years following the Civil War. The claimants could have
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chosen another forum for debate to defend their position, but they resolved instead to seek
judgment of a particular fragment of history before the Courts. It is, however, highly
difficult to objectively put in question before the Courts positive or negative evaluations of
history and of the image that successive generations within a community decide to form of
that history. This is particularly true when one of the most common, barbaric and well-
known characteristics of the Civil War was the annihilation of ideological adversaries.
There are occasions when the Law may attempt to enter into the difficult terrain of the
ideas that constitute our social personality – occasions when it is possible to take legal
action against those who defend or publish certain ideas. It is the view of InDret, however,
that at least as a general rule, it should only be possible to succeed in doing this if the
empirical basis of the historical images is clearly nonexistent.
*       *       *
History continues to unfold: at the time of the writing of this paper, a resolution is pending
for an appeal for protection (amparo) -filed in response to the ruling of the Supreme Court
that we have just reviewed- before the Spanish Constitutional Court on April 13, 1999, and
certiorari was granted. There will be ample time to continue (or modify) the reflections that
have merely been sketched out in this paper.
• Supreme Court, 1st Chamber, 2.6.2000. Enrique Rodríguez Galindo v. Fermín
Muguruza and others
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ROTTENNESS X.- Hey! Kaki! Have you heard? K.- What’s all the fuss about, man? Take
it easy. X.- Haven’t you read the news in Egunkaria? About Lieutenant Colonel Francisco
Rodríguez Galindo? K.-Who? The Guardia Civil officer?  The commander of the
Intxaurrondo1 barracks? One of the main guys in charge of the fight against terrorism? X.-
And one of the main people responsible for the rottenness [podredumbre] I’m going to tell
you about now. He used the anti-terrorist groups to carry out drug trafficking operations.
K.- So, he must also be mixed up in the disappearance of the cocaine in Irún in the Bidasoa
operation. X.-For sure! Two years ago, in May, the Guardia Civil snatched a ton of coke,
and 150 kilos disappeared at the police station. K.-Fucking hell! That’s how it goes: between
political interests and economic interests, we’re all screwed. X.- Hey! Kaki! You know what
I’d do... legalize drugs K.- Yeah, during Prohibition in the States, there were more mafias
than ever. X.-A lot more cutting (adulterations) and on top of that people drank more than
ever. K.-Legalization would at least solve the first problem, and that’d be something.
Nothing surprises me any more.2
Negu Gorriak, a well-known Basque band, included Ustelkeria (Rottenness) on their second
album, Gure Jarrera (Our Position), released in 1991 by Esan Ozenki Records.
The plaintiff, Mr. Enrique Rodríguez Galindo, filed suit against various components of the
group Negu Gorriak, Esan Ozenki Records and others, for protection against defamation. The
plaintiff sought two remedies: on the one hand, to enjoin the defendants to refrain from
similar interferences in the future, to have the song Ustelkeria excluded from subsequent re-
releases of the album, and to prevent the group from performing the song in public. The
second dimension consisted of an action seeking compensation in the amount of €90,151.82,
in addition to legal costs and interests.
The claim was rejected in the first instance by Trial Court number 4 of San Sebastian,
3.1.1994, and substantially affirmed on appeal by the Court of Appeals of San Sebastian,
Section 1, 25.5.1995.
In the fourth motive of the appeal before the Supreme Court, which was accepted by the
Supreme Court, the defendants had alleged violation of article 1139.1 of the Código Civil
(Civil Code - CC) in relation with arts. 1151 and 1137 CC, and of case law doctrine
regarding necessary passive joinder of defendants, given that the suit had not been directed
against Miguel Ángel C. L., one of the co-authors of the lyrics and music for the song. In
point 4 of the opinion, the Supreme Court said:
“According to the evidence documents provided for the proceedings, issued by the
Sociedad General de Autores de España (pages 685 to 703 of the first instance
proceedings), the indicated authors for the lyrics of the work  ‘Ustelkeria’ are
Fermín M. U., Íñigo M. U. and Miguel Ángel C. L., and as authors of the music for
                                                     
1 Mr. Enrique Rodríguez Galindo, then lieutenant colonel in the Guardia Civil, was in command of the
Intxaurrondo barracks (command 513 of the Guardia Civil), as head of the barracks from 1983 to 1995.
2 Translation of the Basque song lyrics as indicated in ruling of the Supreme Court, 1st Chamber, 2.6.2000.
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this work, the three individuals already referred to and Ignacio A. B. The work is,
therefore, one which is the result of the involvement of various persons working
together to achieve a single work, to which they all hold title; the work is one based
on collaboration, covered by the terms of article 7.1 of the Law of Copy Right, both
in the November 11, 1987 version of the text, and in the Revised Text currently in
effect (approved by Legislative Royal Decree 1/1996 of April 12), according to
which ‘The rights to a work that is the unitary result of the collaboration of various
authors correspond to all of them’. In matters not contemplated by this law, this
situation of commonality will be governed by the regulations established in the
Civil Code for common ownership (article 7.4. of the Law of Intellectual Property),
that is to say, by articles 392 and following of the Code”.
“[The] claims [of the plaintiff accepted in] the ruling under appeal directly affect the
moral right and the rights of exploitation of the authors of the work, which are
practically annulled or extinguished. Among these authors is Miguel Angel C. L.,
who is deprived of these rights as an author of the text of the song without having
been heard in court. In relation to proceedings of this type, this court has issued a
doctrine that establishes joint and several liability between author, director of
publication, and publisher. This doctrine denies lack of necessary passive joinder of
defendants if a suit is not filed against all of the defendants, precisely because of the
joint character of the work derived from a set of distinct conducts of distinct natures
that can be imputed to each of the defendants. This doctrine is not applicable in the
case being considered, in which a single action can be imputed to various authors
(the creation of the text): differing degrees of participation cannot be established,
given that the action is the product of various individuals working together in a
coordinated fashion. In conclusion, it must be stated that Miguel Ángel C. L. should
have been called to the proceedings”.
The ruling of the First Chamber is commendable. Apart from the material sense of the
decision, the court skillfully redirects the terms of a civil conflict of difficult resolution to
the space of a meticulous technical-legal debate: if the claims of the plaintiff had been
strictly focused on the question of damages, it could have been argued that the doctrine of
necessary passive joinder of defendants was inapplicable. In spite of some vacillation, it has
for many years been the view of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court that various
defendants involved in causing the harm are jointly and severally liable. This is the case, at
least, when it is not possible to determine the degree to which each party contributes to the
production of the harmful result, and when, therefore, it is necessary to apply art. 1144 CC,
according to which “[t]he creditor may take action against any of the joint debtors or
against all of them simultaneously”.
The recent decision of the Supreme Court, 1st Chamber, 3.11.1999 constitutes an exception to this
line of case law. In this case, an association of owners of semi-detached chalets filed suit against a
builder “Selecciones Inversoras, SA” (“Selesor”), claiming damages based on the deterioration of
their residences. The plaintiff sought compensation of € 6,759 corresponding to the cost of urgent
repairs that had been carried out in the absence of any action on the part of the builder, and the
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completion of work for the definitive consolidation of the properties (necessary to repair a series
of deficiencies in the construction). The Trial Court number 48 of Madrid (7.7.1992) fully allowed
the suit. The Court of Appeals of Madrid reversed in part the decision of the Trial Court, absolved
“Selesor” of payment of the amount claimed, and held that the builder and the architects were
jointly and severally liable. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal filed by “Selesor”, affirmed
the existence of necessary passive joinder of defendants, reversed the previous rulings, and
cancelled the actions ordered by the lower court:
“The consequences drawn from joint and several liability are not correct, but its establishment is:
the contribution of each party involved in the damage caused cannot be individualized.
However, this joint and several liability is “born” with the ruling – it is generated to protect the
injured party. This requires that various subjects have been declared liable in the ruling, which in
turn requires that these defendants have intervened as defendants in the process. There is no
manner in which a party not called to the process can be declared liable, and, consequently
subject to an action for recovery on the part of the convicted party who pays the entire cost of
damages (article 1145) (…). It cannot be deduced from the joint and several liability born in the
ruling that the rules of such liability were already in effect at the time that the suit was filed. This
is the deduction made in the ruling of the Provincial Court, which is in accordance with a
majority orientation in the case law of this Court” (4th Section of Legal Reasoning).
Nevertheless, the most substantial part of the plaintiff’s claim consisted of injunction-type
remedies, formulated on the basis of the model of a Property Rule property rights and other
absolute rights, such as the right to protection from defamation, which has never been limited
to compensatory remedies. It was, therefore, relatively simple for the Court to follow a line of
reasoning from the association of property owners to the right of authorship and to the moral
right of the author, and thus to apply to the case the good old doctrine according to which
rulings won against one joint owner cannot be to the detriment of the others (José María
MIQUEL GONZÁLEZ, 1991, p. 1077), and suit must be filed against all of the joint owners,
thus giving rise to what is known as necessary passive joinder of defendants (José Luis
LACRUZ BERDEJO et al., 2001, p. 353; Angel M. LÓPEZ y LÓPEZ and Vicente L. MONTÉS
PENADÉS (coordinators) et al., 1994., p. 395; Jorge CAFFARENA LAPORTA, 1991, p. 122; Vicente
GUILARTE ZAPATERO, 1980).
At this point, InDret readers may conclude that in this case the Supreme Court evaded a
resolution of the specific conflict, instead taking refuge in procedural questions. No answer
was given to the basic question: what to say about the "rottenness" and about the “drug
trafficking operations” attributed to the plaintiff by the defendants. In fact, during the
period under consideration, the Supreme Court had three occasions to respond to this
question, and took advantage of all of them. Readers interested in the answers and the
reasoning of the Supreme Court may consult Annexes I and II of this paper.
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ANNEX I
Defamation and accusations of corruption concerning a senior officer in the Guardia
Civil
The three cases mentioned in the body of the article and which formed the basis of the
accusation of “rottenness” were the following:
a) Supreme Court, 1st Chamber, 15.1.1999: Between 14.11.1990 and 15.3.1991,
“Diario 16”, a Spanish newspaper, had published 11 articles on a report made
by the public prosecutor of the Provincial Court of Guipúzcoa, Luis Navajas.
Navajas was investigating the possible existence of a group of drug traffickers,
which could include Enrique Rodríguez Galindo as one of its members.
Rodríguez Galindo filed a suit against the journalists and the publisher of the
newspaper, seeking compensation of 50,000,000 pesetas (€300,506.05) and the
publication of the ruling. The suit was rejected in both instances and the
Supreme Court declared that there were no grounds for appeal: the published
information was substantially true, of general interest, and reproduced for the
most part articles published in the newspaper “Egin” in a previous edition.
b) Supreme Court, 1st Chamber, 18.4.2000: “Egin”, in 6 articles published between
15.11.1990 and 17.1.1991, had referred to the previously mentioned report and
to the alleged involvement of Mr. Rodríguez Galindo in the recounted events.
Rodríguez Galindo filed a suit against two journalists, the director and the
publisher of “Egin”, seeking damages of 30,000,000 pesetas (€180,303.63) and
the publication of the ruling. The Trial Court number 2 of Bilbao (3.3.1993) held
in part for the plaintiffs and ordered the defendants to pay 10,000,000 pesetas
(€60,101.21). In appeal, the Court of Appeals of Bilbao (Section 4, 3.4.1995)
reversed the decision of the Trial Court. The Supreme Court rejected the
plaintiff’s appeal: the defendants had done no more than reproduce the
substantial content of the information published in “Diario 16” previously
referred to. Note that the 1999 ruling stated that “Diario 16” reproduced
information published by “Egin” (“the Court a quo established that “Diario 16”
had done no more than provide information concerning what had been
published by the newspaper ‘Egin’ the day before. This information had been
literally transcribed without any alterations, additions, annotations or
commentaries; it was clear to the reader at all times and repeatedly indicated
that this was a reproduction of information provided by another newspaper”).
The 2000 ruling states that “Egin” reproduced information previously
published by “Diario 16” (“the information in question… simply reproduces
InDret 03/2001 Pablo Salvador, Sonia Ramos, Álvaro Luna, Carlos Gómez
15
information… just as it was published in the source, that is, in the newspaper
“Diario 16”, without adding any commentary or evaluation).
c) Supreme Court, 1st Chamber, 13.10.2000: In the book entitled “La red Galindo”
(The Galindo Network), published by the defendant “Txalaparta”, and written
by the co-defendant José Benigno R. R., the events that were the object of the
two cases referred to were narrated in the form of a novel. Mr. Rodríguez
Galindo filed a suit seeking compensation of 60,000,000 pesetas (€360,607.26),
the publication of the ruling, and that the defendants refrain from similar
interference in the future. The instance rulings awarded compensation of
5,000,000 pesetas (€30,050.61) and the Supreme Court upheld the decision. On
this occasion, the Supreme Court agreed with the Provincial Court that the
content of the information was incorrect.
The last three rulings reviewed, which are the only antecedents to which InDret has had
access for review, (and, in fact, which are the only relevant rulings for the creation of case
law) do not suggest a common criterion for resolution. Nevertheless, there are some clear
elements of judgment. One such element is the deference that any Supreme Court must
show in relation to the facts that Lower Courts have declared proven. The second point
concerns the contrast between the resolution of the first two cases, which referred to
newspaper reports, and the third, which concerned a book. Possibly, the difference stems
from an hypothetical requirement for greater rigor on the part of the author of a book than
is demanded of a journalist. However, the Supreme Court does not expressly indicate this,
and nor would it be reasonable to establish such a general criterion: it would be arbitrary to
apply different tests to the same content simply because it appears in a bound form.
Another possible explanation is that the unverified statements that were the basis of the
book were far greater in number and significance than was the case for those supporting
the newspaper reports that were the object of the first two rulings. Finally, the difference
may stem from the confessed intent in the third case to novelize reality, which the Supreme
Court may have seen as an unacceptable license to propagate falsehoods.
In the period being examined, other rulings have resolved cases involving accusations of
corruption and influence peddling: the plaintiff is accused of having obtained a position in the
Treasury Department thanks to the assistance of Alfonso Guerra (Supreme Court, 1st Chamber,
12.6.1998); the plaintiff is accused of having used his position as Under-secretary of the Ministry
of Education and Science to provide inside information to Jesús de Polanco (Supreme Court, 1st
Chamber, 22.6.1998); a report on an urban development scandal in the municipality of Llanes
which implicated various people in a scheme to illegally finance the PSOE , the Spanish socialist
party (Supreme Court, 1st Chamber, 30.7.1998); a member of Benemérita (Guardia Civil) is
implicated in drug trafficking activities (Supreme Court, 1st Chamber, 25.11.1998); a judge is
accused of breach of trust (Supreme Court, 1st Chamber, 16.2.1999); the mayor of Algeciras is
implicated in a €120,202.40 urban development fraud. (Supreme Court, 1st Chamber, 23.3.1999);
the members of an association are accused of corruption (Supreme Court, 1st Chamber, 5.7.1999);
a mayor is accused of fraud and breach of trust in relation with the approval and implementation
of certain urban development plans (Supreme Court, 1st Chamber, 16.7.1999); a Deputy Director
at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is accused of collecting commissions for the purchase of IT
equipment from a German company (Supreme Court, 1st Chamber, 31.12.1999); a court official is
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accused of breach of confidence and of employing a system of bribes (Supreme Court, 1st
Chamber, 27.5.2000); a city councilor is accused of drug trafficking (Supreme Court, 1st Chamber,
24.6.2000); accusations of corruption are made in relation with the re-zoning of land (Supreme
Court, 1st Chamber, 8.7.2000); the plaintiffs are accused of “favoritism” and of giving special
treatment to “buddies” in the renovation of the “Coliseo” building in Eibar and in the municipal
contracting process (Supreme Court, 1st Chamber, 13.10.2000).
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ANNEX II
Counter-terrorism and the dirty war: news of an unfinished process
The ruling of the Supreme Court, 2nd Chamber, of 20.7.2001, which confirms the substance
of the ruling of the First Section of the Penal Chamber of the National Court; 26.4.2000,
convicted Mr. Enrique Rodríguez Galindo of two counts of murder and of false
imprisonment. In this case, José Antonio Lasa and José Ignacio Zabala had been arrested in
Bayona on 15.10.1983, killed by shots to the back of the head and then buried in quicklime
in Busot (Alicante) a few days later.
The Supreme Court ruling referred to is one of many that have been made in relation with
a historical episode in Spain: the formation, under the protection of holders of high public
office in the Spanish government, of so-called “Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación” (“anti-
terrorist liberation groups”). GAL was an armed group, illegally constituted to combat
terrorism using the same means as the terrorists themselves. The ruling of the Supreme
Court, 2nd Chamber, 29.7.1998, which resolves the so-called “Marey Case”, convicted
various members of GAL - not however, Mr. Enrique Rodríguez Galindo - of
misappropriation of public funds, kidnapping and false imprisonment of Segundo Marey,
a French businessman who they mistook for a member of the terrorist group ETA.
